Introduction
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Contemporary theorists tend to think that the basic justification of human rights is instrumental, as efficient means for protecting or promoting the theorist's Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism preferred ultimate value or values. By contrast, a non-instrumentalist account 1 takes human rights to be morally basic rather than derivative. Of course, 2 instrumentalist theorists will disagree about the nature of the ultimate value, proposing a wide array of candidates: the morally basic goods of normative agency, human functioning and capabilities, a minimally good and decent life, and Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Knopf, 1999 also masks an important shared agreement about the basic kind of justification of human rights. Human rights matter because they are tools in the service of morally basic goods intelligible independently of the concept of rights.
Instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist thinkers alike tend to think that human rights have a distinctive normative force, correlating with categorical duties. A categorical duty need not be absolute, but, at least in non-catastrophic circumstances, it must be able to block aggregation and override competing considerations of other kinds. For instance, one's duty not to torture, enslave or slaughter others is categorical in the sense that one may not torture, enslave, or murder in order to prevent a greater number of rights violations or to produce a greater amount goodness.
My aim in this article is to show that instrumentalist accounts of human rights face a dilemma. I will argue that any instrumentalist account faces extraordinary difficulties accommodating categorical duties to respect the human rights of others. This is because instrumentalist accounts make the validity of human rights empirically contingent, thereby making it a contingent matter whether others have duties of respect or of protection in any given occasion. But if this is Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edition (Princeton University Press, 1996) .
Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism
so, no human right can bind categorically. If this argument is sound, it generates a dilemma for instrumentalism: either we should renounce instrumentalism as the basic kind of justification for human rights and their correlative categorical duties, or we must explain away the apparent categorical force of human rights. I will offer some reasons to think that doing away with categorical duties comes at the high cost of potentially rendering human rights unintelligible.
The significance of this dilemma is not that it offers a refutation of instrumentalism as a comprehensive normative doctrine, for such a doctrine might be able to reject the idea of human rights altogether. Instead, the focus of this article is the prevalent assumption that an instrumentalist account can offer a clear and straightforward explanation of human rights and correlative categorical duties. The significance of the dilemma, then, is to cast doubt on such an assumption. In this way, the dilemma should open up three avenues for further reflection: showing that the first horn is false (instrumentalism can indeed accommodate categorical duties), showing that the second horn is false (a deflationary approach can do away with categorical duties but preserve human rights), or taking both horns as as true and exploring earnestly a noninstrumentalist alternative. 7
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTALISM
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In a companion piece, I pursue this third possibility. See Ariel Zylberman, 'Why Human 7 Rights? Because of You ', Journal of Political Philosophy (forthcoming 2016) .
Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism
This preliminary section explains how I shall understand instrumentalism as a justificatory strategy. Ronald Dworkin famously argued that when it comes to the justification of basic ethical or political concepts, a theory will give ultimate pride of justificatory place to one of three concepts: 'it will take some overriding goal, or some set of fundamental rights, or some set of transcendent duties, as fundamental, and show other goals, rights, and duties as subordinate and derivative.' Dworkin's insight is that a practical theory will regard as basic in the 8 order of justification one member of the normative triad goal/duty/right and see the other two as subordinate and derivative.
Dworkin's classification offers a helpful way of characterizing the structure of instrumentalism about human rights. As I shall understand it, an instrumentalist account takes human rights as morally derivative and grounds them as means for the production of a morally basic goal, a good intelligible independently of the concept of rights. As John Tasioulas puts it,
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" 5 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 171.
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Current instrumentalist accounts of human rights are almost exclusively goal-based, so I 9 shall focus on these and set aside duty-based accounts. Duty-based accounts were more common in late medieval and early modern philosophy. To the extent that these accounts were of human rights and to the extent they were instrumentalist, they grounded natural rights in basic natural law duties. Rights are derived from (certain of) our interests that can be specified independently of the concept of a right. 10 The fundamental justification of human rights is instrumentalist in the sense that human rights are valid in virtue of the fact that they (tend to) produce good states of affairs, the goodness of which is intelligible independently of the concept of rights. For any instrumentalist account, then, human rights have a conditional rather than unconditional validity: human rights are justified on the condition that they meet an external goal. By contrast, a non-instrumentalist account will be 11 rights-based and will grant rights a 'foundational role in ethical thought' by representing them as trumps or as aspects of the inviolable status of persons. 12
Of course, instrumentalist theorists will have important disagreements.
Does a single good ground human rights, or does a plurality of goods ground
Tasioulas, 'The Moral Reality of Human Rights,' p. 88.
10
As Christine Korsgaard has argued, we may make two distinctions in goodness, one 11 along the means/end register, the other along the extrinsic/intrinsic one. our purpose is that these various accounts share the same instrumentalist structure, for the problems I will highlight pertain to the structure itself rather than to a specific articulation of it.
CATEGORICAL DUTIES
Before assessing whether an instrumentalist account can accommodate the categorical duties thought to correlate with human rights, we need a working notion of a categorical duty.
For the purposes of the argument here we may say that a categorical duty binds necessarily, is preemptive or exclusionary, and is non-aggregative. To say 15 that a categorical duty binds necessarily is to say that it does not bind contingently. Unlike categorical duties, your reason to purchase eggs is contingent on your having the further end, for instance, of making an omelet. To say that a categorical duty is preemptive is to say that it blocks considerations of other kinds
Griffin is virtually alone in defending a monistic grounding for human rights.
13
See notes 3-6 above. 
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In order to judge that a watch is a useful means of telling time, we must judge not only how well a watch tells time, but also how well alternative means tell time.
And that latter judgment presupposes the empirical judgment of what alternative means are available.
Applied to the topic of human rights, Empirical Contingency says that, if human rights are justified instrumentally, the justification of human right R will be contingent not only on its effectiveness in producing a certain goal (e.g., the value of personhood, the protection of urgent interests, the fulfillment of capabilities), but also on the effectiveness of R relative to alternative available
Indeed, the instrumental judgment is contingent in a third sense, depending on whether 27 the end itself is contingent or necessary in practical thought. Alternatively put, for instrumentalist models the relationship of right, the duty to respect the human rights of others, matters only indirectly: the duty matters not because it is owed to the other, but rather because it generally promotes some fundamental intrinsic good. But if duties correlative to human rights matter only indirectly, their justification will be contingent and conditional, rather than categorical and necessary.
Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for
Let me illustrate this thought with two kinds of human rights that appear to be clear candidates for correlating with categorical duties, the human rights to life and to security of the person correlating with duties not to commit genocide or torture. The point of concern is that instrumentalist accounts seem committed, in virtue of their justificatory structure, to make General Ratko Mladić's duty not categorical but contingent on whether, on that fateful occasion of 1995, alternative means would be more efficient in producing the grounding end.
According to instrumentalist accounts, the justification of the judgment A has a duty not to commit genocide is instrumental: A's duty is contingent on and derivative from more basic goods, such as normative personhood, capacity realization, or the protection of urgent interests. Obviously, A's genocide against the minority population contravenes some of these goods, by diminishing overall normative personhood, capacity realization, or the protection of urgent interests. But suppose that on this occasion the massacre, as odious as any massacre is, was an efficient means of ending the war and thereby avoiding a greater loss of life. If so, an instrumentalist account would have difficulties warranting the view that anyone has a duty to not commit genocide.
In response, one might argue that instrumentalist and noninstrumentalist accounts alike recognize that under catastrophic circumstances a
Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism duty to not commit genocide may be overridden. In non-catastrophic circumstances, the duty remains categorical.
Nevertheless, the point of concern is not that under catastrophic circumstances an instrumentalist account would have to override a duty to not commit genocide. Rather, the point of concern is that even when the catastrophic threshold is not surpassed, the instrumentalist would not be able to accommodate the categorical force of the duty to not commit genocide. More generally, if on some non-catastrophic occasions committing a small genocide is most conducive to overall or aggregate goodness, then contravening the duty not to commit genocide would be a more efficient means of producing goodness. If so, then instrumentalist accounts seem committed to the view that even under noncatastrophic circumstances the duty to respect the human right to life and to not commit genocide cannot be categorically binding.
A similar difficulty emerges when reflecting on the right to not be tortured. This case can be even more difficult for instrumentalist accounts, since the circumstances under which torture may be warranted by the good outcomes it would secure can seem to occur more commonly. Once again, the point of concern is not that instrumentalist accounts would break down and warrant torture in catastrophic circumstances. Rather, the point of concern is that instrumentalist accounts would warrant torture even in ordinary circumstances. arguing that to shoot down a a hijacked plane would be to 'ignore the status of the persons affected as subjects endowed with dignity and inalienable rights.' 37
But note that the Court's judgment did not turn on an absolute ban on killing, for it permitted shooting down the plane if it were occupied solely by terrorists.
Regardless of how we justify killing terrorists who are about to kill others, e.g. in terms of their forfeiture of the right to life, the point is that there is no obvious warrant for respecting and instituting a right to due process, since recognizing such a right would be more productive of evil than of good. But once the justification of the right to due process is fixed in this way, the duty to respect the right to due process becomes empirically contingent and cannot be categorical.
Third, assume for the sake of argument that there is a human right to political participation. If so, states would have a categorical duty to respect and protect this right. Suppose then that in a given society the level of well-being, capacity realization, or whichever fundamental intrinsic good one prefers could be better realized if no one were granted a right to political participation.
Suppose further that the level of GDP might be more efficiently increased in an authoritarian and centralized rather than democratic government. This would mean that in such a society an instrumentalist account would not recognize a duty to respect the right to political participation, since doing so would be a less efficient means of producing the preferred fundamental intrinsic good. And once the justification of the right to political participation is fixed in this way, the duty to respect the right to political participation becomes empirically contingent rather than categorical.
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Nagel envisages a similar case. See Nagel, 'Private Rights', p. 38. Indeed, the 38 cumbersome character of due process and its tendency to produce more evil than good appears as a common trope of 'cop-shows'.
Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism
The reason for considering these other kinds of cases is to see that it is not just the duties to not torture or to not commit genocide that would not be categorical under an instrumentalist account. Rather, the duties to respect other largely uncontroversial human rights, such as the rights to life, due process, or political participation could not be categorical either. Similar cases may be constructed for any other right one takes as a human right.
In sum, my point has not been that an instrumentalist account cannot accommodate any categorical duties or that it cannot justify rights. Instead, the point of Empirical Contingency is that the very structure of an instrumentalist account makes the justification of the directed duties correlative to human rights an indirect, contingent, and instrumental matter. As a result, it becomes difficult to see how such duties could be categorical.
INDISPENSABLE MEANS
But this argument can seem vulnerable to the objection that it works only on the assumption of a crude picture of instrumental justification. Indeed, there are two ways of making instrumental justification more sophisticated: strengthening the instrumental necessity of human rights or shifting to an indirect model of instrumental justification. The next two sections develop these more sophisticated models of instrumental justification and show how these models remain vulnerable to the same problem.
The first objection is that I have relied on too crude a picture of instrumentalist justification, for I have conflated the distinction between X being a 
INDIRECT INSTRUMENTALISM
The second objection is that I have relied on too crude a picture of instrumentalist justification, for I have assumed that an instrumentalist account must be direct rather than indirect. Mirroring indirect forms of consequentialism, such as rule-consequentialism, we could formulate an indirect form of instrumentalism. The objection would then be that where a simple act- Begin with the third condition. Scanlon's plausible claim is that for an indirect instrumentalist (or, as he calls it, 'two-tier') account, moral (or human) rights would be justified by how assigning these rights 'will produce a different outcome'. Scanlon acknowledges that this is an empirical, rather than a conceptual judgment. But if the validity of a human right R is contingent on an empirical judgment about the likely outcome produced by acceptance of R, as a Griffin's argument against a human right to democracy is simple and powerful:
there is no human right to democracy because it is possible in certain realistic though uncommon conditions that a non-democratic regime may realize the values of personhood more efficiently than a democratic one. This view entails the claim that there is no categorical duty to respect the right to political participation. Under certain empirical circumstances R (here, a right to political participation) would command our respect, but not in others.
The difficulty on which I would like to focus does not concern the substantive view of whether there is a human right to democracy. The trouble is " 32
Griffin, On Human Rights, p. 249. Here is how Peter Railton, himself a consequentialist, puts the point:
Ultimately, however, I suspect that rule-consequentialism is untenable in either form, for it could recommend acts that (subjectively or objectively) accord with the best set of rules even when these rules are not in fact generally accepted, and when as a result these acts would have devastatingly bad consequences. 44 Railton's familiar worry is that any indirect version of consequentialism is necessarily unstable because under certain empirical conditions -conditions of partial compliance where the ideal rule is not generally followed -following the rules would have terrible consequences. For instance, even if an ideal code
Peter Railton, 'Alienation, Consequentialism, Morality', ed. S. Scheffler Consequentialism … by including in their favored code a particularly strong requirement that one prevent great harm, rule-consequentialists can escape having to maintain that it is morally right to stick to the (normally optimific) rules in those situations in which our doing so would result in very much worse consequences. 45 In a nutshell, Hooker's proposed solution to the problem of partial compliance is to build into the ideal version of our preferred indirect instrumentalism a proviso that one prevent great harm, such that, under conditions of partial or negligible Griffin's thought is that unless a teleological account can explain how human rights are resistant to trade-offs (how they generate exclusionary reasons), then a teleological account will not be able to explain human rights at all. The question before us, then, is whether we need to go all the way to categorical duties in order to preserve a recognizable picture of human rights.
Indeed, in answering his own question, James Griffin offers one of the best arguments I know of in defense of the thought that an instrumentalist on the one hand, the instrumentalist clearly cannot presuppose a deontological notion of respect as a way of blocking maximizing considerations, for, again, that would amount to a collapse into non-instrumentalism. On the other hand, the instrumentalist must appeal to a teleological notion of respect, but, unlike the deontological notion, such a notion does not have a built-in resistance to tradeoffs. If by 'respect' one means counting equally the good of persons, then, nothing in that notion of respect offers us the resources to block maximization. If so, the distinction between promoting and respecting goods allows Griffin to distinguish consequentialism from a non-maximizing teleology only by presupposing a non-instrumentalist picture of respect for another's rights. The point of concern remains the same: it is not clear that the notion of respecting goods can be robust enough to buttress the resistance of human rights to trade-offs " 45
For this contrast, see Railton, 'Alienation, Consequentialism ', p. 124, fn. 32. without surreptitiously appealing to a deontic notion of respect. We return, then, to the same puzzle.
Let us take stock. The second horn of the dilemma for instrumentalism involves rejecting categorical duties and taking a deflationary approach to human rights. This approach raises a puzzle: can a deflationary version of instrumentalism explain the resistance of human rights to trade-offs below a certain threshold? The puzzle emerges because if the rights in question would not be resistant in any way, it would look as if we have lost from view the notion of a right and replaced it with a mere consideration for taking one course of action or another. I have considered what I take to be one of the best attempts to solve this puzzle, namely, Griffin's three explanations of how human rights can remain resistant to trade-offs without correlating to categorical duties. But I have argued that none of these explanations is convincing. In a different way, each explanation makes a good resistant to trade-offs only by presupposing a deontic picture of the role of personhood. Since this picture of personhood implicates a notion of rights, each explanation appears able to block trade-offs only by relying on rights.
And if so, Griffin's non-maximizing teleology collapses into non-instrumentalism.
Of course, Griffin's are not the only possible arguments in defense of nonmaximizing instrumentalism. So my argument here is not meant as a proof that every instrumentalist account must be maximizing or that no deflationary instrumentalist approach can illuminate the idea of human rights. Rather, my argument is more modest: one of the best ways of explaining how a deflationary 
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Conclusion
Many, if not most, contemporary thinkers assume that the fundamental justification of human rights must take an instrumentalist form. They also tend to assume that if we are to offer an adequate explanation of human rights, we must also show how human rights correlate with categorical duties. My aim in this article has been to show that instrumentalism about human rights faces a dilemma. Since both direct and indirect instrumentalist accounts face extraordinary difficulties accommodating categorical duties, we should reject either instrumentalism or the thought that human rights correlate with categorical duties. In the final section, I argued that, at least based on our assessment of one of the best arguments for a deflationary approach, giving up on categorical duties comes at the high cost of making human rights unintelligible. My main aim has been to cast doubt on the common assumption that an instrumentalist account can easily accommodate the categorical duty to respect the human rights of others.
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The dilemma for instrumentalism can invite us to pursue three avenues of further reflection. First, it can invite us to show that the first horn is false and that an instrumentalist account can indeed accommodate categorical duties.
Second, it can invite us to develop a deflationary approach not vulnerable to the problems I raised for Griffins' account. The challenge then would be to show how human rights can be resistant to trade-offs under a certain threshold without smuggling in deontological notions. And third, it can invite us to embrace the first horn, reject instrumentalism, and explore a non-instrumentalist approach to human rights. This is the avenue of reflection I pursue in a companion piece, 56 where I argue that a relational approach grounding human rights in a basic norm of reciprocity can preserve a non-instrumentalist model of justification while avoiding vicious circularity and emptiness, the two problems typically thought to afflict any non-instrumentalist justification. 57 " Weinstock, and an anonymous reviewer.
